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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the development of a SmallSat computer system that provides increased tolerance to radiation
induced faults through a novel architecture implemented on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGA). The computer system provides increased reliability, computational performance, and power
efficiency at a fraction of the cost of existing radiation-hardened computer systems. This computer technology has
had its technical readiness level steadily increased over the past 8 years through a variety of tests and flight
demonstrations. These include high energy particle bombardment at the Texas A&M Radiation Effects Facility, 8
high altitude balloon flights to 30km, and a 2014 sounding rocket flight to 120km. The technology was selected by
the NASA SmallSat Technology Partnership program in 2013 as one of the cross-cutting technologies that will
enable advanced computing in small satellites and is being matured for even more rigorous flight demonstrations.
These include a second sounding rocket flight to an altitude of 300km followed by a 6 month low earth orbit
demonstration on the International Space Station, both in 2016. This computer technology was selected by the 2015
NASA CubeSat Launch Initiative for a long term stand-alone mission in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in 2017.

tile is replaced with a known good spare and
foreground TMR operation continues. The damaged
tile is repaired in the background by reinitializing its
configuration memory through partial reconfiguration.
Faults detected in inactive tiles by the scrubber are also
repaired in the background and reintroduced as spares.
This approach mitigates single event effects (SEEs) in
the FPGA circuit fabric in addition to SEE’s in the
configuration memory. The advantage of this approach
is that foreground operation can continue while faulted
tiles are repaired and reintroduced into the system in the
background. Since bringing on a spare tile takes
significantly less time than performing background
repair via partial reconfiguration of the damaged tile,
the system availability is increased. This approach has
been shown to improve the mean-time-before-failure
compared to TMR+scrubbing alone. This computer
architecture has been demonstrated on a Xilinx Virtex-6
FPGA with 9-tiles. For the final RadSat mission, the
architecture will be implemented on a Xilinx Artix-7
FPGA with 4-tiles. More details on this technology can
be found in [1-7].

INTRODUCTION
RadSat is the name of a satellite mission to demonstrate
a novel computer architecture designed to mitigate
radiation induced faults using COTS FPGAs. The
computer technology is implemented as an experiment
within RadSat to demonstrate it in an operational space
environment. The fault mitigation approach in this
computer involves breaking a commercial FPGA fabric
into redundant tiles, each with the characteristics that
they can fully contain the circuit of interest and also be
individually
reprogrammed
using
partial
reconfiguration. Currently, each tile contains a full
computer system based on a Xilinx MicroBlaze soft
processor. At any given time, three of the tiles run in
triple modular redundancy (TMR) with the rest of the
tiles reserved as spares. The TMR voter is able to
detect faults in the active triad by voting on the tile
outputs. A configuration memory scrubber continually
runs in the background and is able to detect faults in the
configuration memory of both the active and inactive
tiles. In the event of a fault in the active triad, (either
detected by the TMR voter or scrubber), the damaged
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insulating materials of the electronic devices. When
this trapped charge occurs in the gate oxide of a
transistor it causes the threshold voltage to be altered,
which leads to input leakage current and eventually puts
the device into a state where it is either always on or
always off. When this trapped charge occurs in the
isolation regions between devices, it can cause leakage
current that consumes excessive power and can
ultimately destroy the device. TID exposure causes a
gradual degradation of the part as opposed to
instantaneous failure. The following figure shows the
cross-section of typical MOSFET device and how
various radiation strikes cause different types of
failures.

MOTIVATION
Technology Relevance to NASA
The NASA Earth Science Decadal Survey states the
need for on-board processing and power efficiency that
far exceeds existing computer systems in order to meet
NASA’s future science goals [8]. Additionally, the
problem statement for the flight computing needs
within the NASA TA11: Technology & Processing
Roadmap is “ultra-reliable, radiation hardened
platforms which, until recently, have been costly and
limited in performance” [9]. The TA11 roadmap also
calls for innovative computing architectures to meet the
needs of both science and engineering and emphasizes
the need for scalable processing platforms that include
intelligent fault-tolerant technologies to increase the
robustness of computing platforms for long-duration
missions. Simultaneously, the 2014 NASA Strategic
Plan calls for “transforming NASA’s missions and the
Nation’s capabilities by maturing crosscutting and
innovative space technologies” (Objective 1.7),
particularly those that decrease cost and thus expand
opportunities for future space activities [10].

Figure 1: Cross-Section of a MOSFET Device
Showing Radiation Fault Mechanisms.

Radiation Effects on Space Computers

SEE faults refer to electron/hole pairs caused by high
energy particles and heavy ions striking the diffusion
regions of a device. SEEs do not cause permanent
damage to the device like TID does, but they do cause
unwanted logic level transitions. These unwanted
transitions lead to logic system failures such as erratic
computer behavior or full system crashes. When a
high-energy particle passes through an integrated circuit
and generates enough free charge carriers to change the
state of a digital logic line, it is called a single event
transient (SET). If this voltage transient is captured and
stored by a flip-flop or other memory device, the event
is referred to as a single event upset (SEU). It is
generally possible to recover from an SEU by simply
resetting the affected circuit. However, if the SEU
somehow produces such an alteration that a reset alone
is not sufficient to restore the device to a healthy state,
it is called a single event functional interrupt (SEFI).
SEFI’s typically require more drastic recovery
measures such as power cycling or full system reinitialization.

Space computers must operate in a harsh radiation
environment that leads to multiple types of failures.
Radiation effects are separated into two broad
categories: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Single Event
Effects (SEE) [11-12].
Each of these failure
mechanisms are caused by ionizing radiation striking
the integrated circuit substrate and depositing unwanted
energy. TID failure is caused by lower energy protons
and electrons (<30MeV/amu) striking the substrate and
creating electron/hole pairs that are trapped in the

Historically, the feature sizes of integrated circuits used
to implement space computers were such that TID was
the primary concern with respect to radiation. Larger
devices had thick oxide insulators that were highly
susceptible to charge trapping because of their
relatively large volumes within the device.
Simultaneously, the diffusion regions of the older
devices where large enough that a high energy particle
strike did not cause sufficient energy in order to change
the state of a logic gate. This was because the radiation

The NASA Strategic Plan also highlights one of its
main activities to achieve its goals is “moving forward
with critical research and technology demonstrations on
the ISS” [10].
With the prevalence of computer
systems in all future NASA missions, improving the
capability of space computers has significant relevance
and broad-scale impact across all NASA programs.
Using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to implement space
computer systems has the greatest potential to increase
on-board processing and power efficiency while at the
same time providing platform scalability and reduced
cost.
Using COTS FPGAs allows increased
computation and power efficiency by taking advantage
of advances in commercial fabrication processes.
Implementing a radiation fault mitigation strategy on
FPGAs provides reliability while at the same time
drastically reduces the cost of space computing through
the use of COTS parts.
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particles sizes were relatively small compared to the
diffusion region volume and a strike could not create a
sufficient amount of charge to switch the device. In
modern integrated circuits (e.g., below the 65um
process node), the feature sizes have been reduced to
the point where TID is no longer the dominating failure
mechanism. This is because the oxide thicknesses of
the devices are so thin that the statistical probability of
charge getting trapped is minimal. Thus, modern ICs
are becoming inherently tolerant to TID. For example,
modern FPGAs are achieving TID tolerance levels
>300krad when implemented in the 65nm process node
and as much as 600krad when implemented in a 22nm
node [13]. As TID immunity is increased with each
subsequent process node, so is the susceptibility to
SEEs. In modern devices, faults caused by SEEs are
now the greatest concern [14]. This is because the
diffusion regions of modern devices have been reduced
in size to the point where the charge caused by a
radiation strike is sufficient to cause a state change.
What makes SEEs even more concerning is that the
energy levels are significantly high that shielding is not
practical. To stop all high energy particles capable of
causing SEEs in modern devices it would require an
aluminum shield a meter thick. Furthermore, the
energy levels of these particles are so high that they
cannot be reproduced on Earth. This means that
solutions to mitigate faults caused by SEEs can only
truly be evaluated in a space environment.

devices. This technique, known as radiation-hardenedby-design (RHBD), uses approaches such as enclosedlayout-transistors and guard rings in order to minimize
the area of susceptible insulating regions and provide
safe conduction paths for radiation induced charge
carriers to flow instead of being trapped in the
insulating materials [16].
The second historical
technique to mitigate TID is to use non-standard
materials in the fabrication process. This technique,
known as radiation-hardened-by-process (RHBP),
fabricates the devices with materials that are less
susceptible to charge trapping and produce fewer
electron/hole pairs during a radiation strike. These
techniques have achieved TID tolerance in the range of
300krad-1Mrad [17].
There are a variety of drawbacks of using RHBD and
RHBP TID mitigation techniques [18]. First, the
techniques require additional circuit area, thus the
performance and power efficiency is less than devices
fabricated in the same node using standard design
approaches. Second, since the fabrication procedures
are custom and the part volumes are low, it leads to
extremely expensive computer systems. For example,
radiation hardened processors such as HyperX,
Maestro, and the RAD6000 can cost as much as 40x
greater than commercial equivalents and only achieve
computation rates up to 35 MIPs [9]. The BAE
RAD750 radiation-hardened processor has achieved
performance rates up to 200 MIPs but also has a similar
cost and consumes up to 20W for the full computer
system [19]. Radiation hardened processors typically
lag behind commercial equivalents by approximately 10
years in performance (see figure 2) [20]. This
performance gap in addition to the high cost of custom,
radiation hardened processors has created a new
demand for space computers that use novel approaches
to radiation tolerance.

While modern FPGAs are a highly attractive platform
for space computing due to their low cost, performance,
flexibility, and increased TID immunity, they are
uniquely susceptible to SEEs [15]. An FPGA stores the
data that represents its current hardware configuration
in banks of SRAM inside the device. SEUs that occur
within this SRAM alter the circuit configuration of the
FPGA. Such faults cannot be corrected by a simple
reset since the circuit itself is changed by the SEU.
Therefore, SEFIs are far more common in SRAM-based
FPGAs than in traditional integrated circuits. SEFI’s
require the configuration SRAM to be reinitialized
before the circuitry can then be reset and continue
operation. Additionally, FPGAs are susceptible to
SETs and SEUs in their circuit fabrics just as any other
digital device. This means that any FPGA used to
implement a space computer must have a strategy for
mitigating all SEEs including SETs, SEUs, and SEFIs.
Existing Approaches to Radiation Hardened/Tolerant
Space Computing
There are three common techniques that have
historically been used to mitigate TID in space
computers. The first is to use non-standard layout
techniques in order to minimize the probability of
charge getting trapped in the insulating materials of the
LaMeres
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The third historical technique to mitigate TID is to use
shielding. There are also a variety of drawbacks of
using shielding to mitigate TID including increased
mass and the inability of shielding to stop higher energy
radiation. The following figure shows the dose rate that
will make it to a circuit substrate for varying
thicknesses of aluminum shielding [21]. The plot
shows the results for the typical TID causing radiation
experienced in LEO. This plot illustrates that there is a
diminishing return in the amount of protection that is
provided by shielding for thicknesses above ~0.15”.
The total dose reaching the circuit, comprised mainly of
protons (~30MeV/amu) is not significantly reduced
even when the shielding thickness is doubled.
Shielding inefficiency becomes even more pronounced
for higher energy radiation (100MeV-1GMeV). Since
adding mass to a space mission is extremely expensive,
the use of excessive shielding is an unattractive
technique and new measures to radiation tolerance are
needed.

the two properly operating circuits), thus creating a
final output that was not affected by the SEE. In the
event of an SEU, a recovery procedure is typically
needed after the final result is produced in order to put
the faulted circuit back into an operational state. If the
fault was created by a SEFI, an even more sophisticated
recovery procedure is needed. The following figure
shows the typical TMR topology.

Figure 4: Triple Modulo Redundancy
Memory scrubbing is the process of continually
checking the contents of memory for failures by either
comparing it to a known good copy (for the cases of
configuration or program memory) or comparing it to
redundant memory components (for the case of variable
memory) [24].
When scrubbing configuration or
program memory, the system requires a radiation-safe,
non-volatile memory device for storing the golden copy
that is often implemented using either PROMs or
EEPROMs that are more SEE immune but un-writable
during normal operation.
For space computers
implemented on FPGAs, scrubbing of the configuration
memory must be done continually in order to detect and
recover from SEFIs.
While TMR and scrubbing are widely accepted SEE
mitigation techniques, they have multiple drawbacks
that should be addressed for increased reliability. First,
TMR protects against instantaneous errors, but its
reliability decreases as the length of the mission grows
and the probability of faults in multiple modules
increases due to the additional circuit area of the
triplication; in fact, TMR becomes less reliable than
simplex systems after a certain mission time has been
exceeded [23]. Scrubbing, on the other hand, prevents
errors from accumulating, but cannot always correct
recent errors fast enough to prevent bad outputs. The
latency between the occurrence of a fault in
configuration memory and detection by the scrubber
can be significant due to the sequential manner that the
scrubber traverses the configuration memory [24].

Figure 3: Effective Dose Rate vs. Aluminum
Shielding Thickness in LEO [21].
Existing SEE mitigation strategies fall broadly into two
categories: (1) redundancy and (2) memory scrubbing
[22]. The most commonly adopted form of redundancy
is triple modulo redundancy (TMR) [23]. TMR
involves triplication of the computing hardware and
adding a voting circuit to compare the outputs of the
three hardware modules. In the event of an SEE fault in
one of the circuits, two of the circuits are still operating
properly. The voter will produce the final system
output based on the majority of the three circuits (e.g.,
LaMeres
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tile MicroBlaze system. Each square within the floor
plan represents a tile that contains a full 32-bit
MicroBlaze soft processor and can be partially
reconfigured.

OUR CONTRIBUTION TO SPACE COMPUTING
Montana State University (MSU) has been researching
an architecture that improves the state-of-the-art in
space computing by deploying a novel SEE fault
mitigation architecture on modern COTS FPGAs.
Using a COTS FPGA fabricated in a process node of
45nm yields an acceptable level of TID immunity
inherently through minimal feature sizes (~400krad).
The use of a modern COTS FPGA also provides a
significant increase in computational performance and
power efficiency compared to custom, radiation
hardened processors that use RHBD or RHBP
techniques. The use of a COTS FPGA produces a
tremendous reduction in cost by avoiding using lowvolume, custom, radiation-hardened parts. MSU’s
novel SEE mitigation architecture (details below)
improves reliability beyond TMR+Scrubbing in order
to deliver a platform that addresses all of NASA’s
priorities for next generation space computers.
MSU’s SEE fault mitigation approach extends
TMR+Scrubbing by including spare circuitry to
enhance the operation of TMR and a spatially aware
approach to improve traditional scrubbing. MSU’s
approach to providing reliability involves breaking a
commercial FPGA fabric into redundant tiles, each with
the characteristics that they can fully contain the circuit
of interest and also be individually reprogrammed using
partial reconfiguration. For purposes of demonstration,
each tile contains a Xilinx MicroBlaze soft processor
(32-bit RISC architecture provided by Xilinx). At any
given time, three of the tiles run in TMR with the rest
of the tiles reserved as spares. The TMR voter is able
to detect faults in the active triad by voting on the tile
outputs. A configuration memory scrubber continually
runs in the background and is able to detect faults in the
configuration memory of both the active and inactive
tiles. In the event of a fault in the active triad, (either
detected by the TMR voter or scrubber), the damaged
tile is replaced with a known good spare and
foreground TMR operation continues. The damaged
tile is repaired in the background by reinitializing its
configuration memory through partial reconfiguration.
This approach mitigates SEUs in the FPGA circuit
fabric in addition to SEFIs in the configuration
memory. The advantage of this approach is that
foreground operation can continue while the faulted tile
is repaired and reintroduced into the system in the
background. Since bringing on a spare tile takes
significantly less time than performing background
repair via partial reconfiguration of the damaged tile,
the system availability is increased. This approach has
been implemented on a Virtex-6 LX75-1 FPGA with 9
MicroBlaze soft processors. The following figure
shows a prototype Virtex-6 FPGA board that has been
developed at MSU and the FPGA floor plan of the 9LaMeres

Figure 5: FPGA Board and Fabric Layout of
Partially Reconfigurable Architecture.
In order to theoretically analyze the reliability of the
SEE mitigation strategy, a Markov model was used. A
Markov model describes a system as a directed graph,
in which each node is a state and each edge represents a
transition between states. The states traverse between
“Good” and “Failed” based on incoming faults and fault
recovery. For systems with the ability to recover from
a fault (e.g., TMR, Scrubbing, Spares), there are one or
more intermediate states in the graph that allow the
system to continue operation in the presence of a fault.
The timing of the transitions through the graph are
dictated by the fault rate (e.g., incoming radiation) and
the repair rate (e.g., scrubbing and/or circuit
5
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replacement). The following figures show the Markov
chains for three FPGA-based computer systems. The
first chain represents a single MicroBlaze processor
implemented on a Virtex-6 FPGA with no fault
mitigation strategy. This is the “Non-Redundant”
system and will fail when a radiation induced fault
occurs in a sensitive region. The second Markov chain
is the typical fault mitigation approach used on FPGAbased
MicroBlaze
space
computers
(e.g.,
TMR+Scrubbing). This system can tolerate a single
fault in its triad and will recover as long as the error is
corrected by the scrubber before another fault occurs in
one of the other active circuits. The last Markov chain
improves upon TMR+Scrubbing by including 6 spare
circuits (e.g., the MSU approach). The spare circuits
allow the system to withstand more radiation faults
before failing by reducing recovery time. This system
also has the ability to partially reconfigure damaged
tiles in the background and reintroduce them into the
system
as
spares.
This
is
the
“TMR+Scrubbing+Spares” system.

as a function of the incoming fault rate.
The
availability is the percentage of the time that the
foreground operation is doing computation, as opposed
to waiting for or performing repair. This plot illustrates
how a TMR+Scrubbing+Spare system delivers
significantly
more
computation
architecturally
compared to the other systems.

Figure 7: Availability of Different FPGA Fault
Mitigation Approaches.
In order to determine the system’s reliability in a
representative environment, fault rates for the Markov
model were extracted from the CREME96 tool for a
LOE orbit [25]. The space weather environment was
set for the worst week, solar flare conditions.
CREME96 considers both the radiation strike rate but
also the linear energy transfer of the device when
predicting SEEs. The resource utilization is then
factored to find the design specific SEE rate [26]. As
expected, the highest fault rate was experienced in the
South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) at 1.1 SEEs/second.
This corresponded to related data in [27] and [28]. In
[27], a Virtex-4 FPGA-based computer developed by
the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and deployed
on MISSE-7 experienced 0.1 SEEs/day averaged across
the entire ISS orbit under normal weather conditions.
The following figure shows the probability of a failure
based on the hours of operation in the worst case ISS
environment (e.g., the SAA). From this plot, the MeanTime-Before-Failure (MTBF) can be extracted, which
is defined as the point at which the probability of failure
is 50%.
This
figure shows that the
TMR+Scrubbing+Spares
approach
achieves
a
significantly longer MTBF compared to the traditional
TMR+Scrubbing approach (5.4 hours vs. 3.6 minutes).
This analysis verifies that the proposed system
dramatically increases the reliability over existing fault
mitigation strategies by a factor of 90x. In the event of

Figure 6: Markov Chains used to Compare SEE
Mitigation Approaches.
The rate to replace a damaged tile with a spare was
determined empirically on the Virtex-6 at 1ms. The
rate to repair a damaged tile via scrubbing was
determined empirically on the Virtex-6 at 100ms. The
following figure shows the availability of each system
LaMeres

6

29th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

a more severe radiation environment (e.g., peak 5
minutes of a solar storm) that has a fault rate with the
potential to overrun the MSU system and causes a
system failure, a 2-minute watch dog timer is included
that will trigger a full FPGA reconfiguration.

Figure 9: Cross-Section of Radiation Sensor.
Figure 8: Failure Probability of Different FPGA
Fault Mitigation Approaches.
Another novel contribution of the MSU system is the
use of a spatial radiation sensor that is coupled with the
FPGA to reduce the latency between a fault occurrence
and repair by the scrubber. MSU has developed a
sensor that detects the spatial location of ionizing
radiation with energy levels capable of causing single
event faults in modern FPGAs [29]. This technology
uses a wide area, vertical p-i-n junction as the sensing
element. The top and bottom sides of the silicon die
contain strips of electrodes that are orthogonal to each
other. As radiation passes through the sensor, it creates
electron-hole pairs in the depletion region of the p-i-n
junction. Due to the built-in electric field of the
junction, electrons are swept to the top side and holes
are swept to the bottom side. The electrodes collect the
excess charge and allow the XY location of the strike to
be detected by observing the intersection of the current
pulses. A p-i-n structure is used so that it takes less
voltage to fully deplete the sensing element (+14v)
compared to typical p-n detectors that takes as much as
+50v to fully deplete [29]. The current pulses from the
electrodes are amplified, digitized and sampled. This
information is used by the control system for the FPGA
to provide yet another layer of fault mitigation. Strikes
in active tiles will cause a spare processor to be brought
online. Strikes in inactive spares will cause the
scrubber to repair the tile before it is brought online,
which keeps more good spares available to the system.
The size of the MSU sensor is 20mm x 20mm, which is
large enough to cover any commercial FPGA die. The
sensor has 256 discrete detection pixels, which gives
numerous pixels within each tile. The following figure
shows a montage of information about the radiation
sensor that has been developed at MSU.
LaMeres

Figure 10: Sensor Implementation.
This computer implementation using a Xilinx Virtex-6
LX115-1 FPGA has achieved performance of 234 MIPs
at 2W of full system power consumption. This
represents a 2x improvement in power efficiency
compared to the RAD750 and a 7x increase in
performance compared to the more widely adopted
radiation hardened processors (e.g., HyperX, Maestro,
RAD6000). The Virtex-6 uses a 45nm process node
that has been shown to provide up to 380krad (1 Mrad
with reduced timing) [14] of TID immunity, which
meets the TID requirements for the majority of space
missions [30]. The novel SEE mitigation strategy of
our computer extends the SEE immunity of a COTS
Virtex-6 FPGA beyond existing mitigation strategies by
a factor of 90x. The Mean-Time-Before-Failure due to
SEE’s on the Virtex-6 of the proposed system in the
worst case ISS orbit (e.g., the SAA) under worst week
conditions is 5.4 hours compared to only 3.6 minutes
using
existing
mitigation
strategies
(e.g.,
TMR+Scrubbing). This computer system promises to
meet the performance, power efficiency, and reliability
requirements of future science missions at a cost that is
100x lower than existing radiation hardened computers.
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COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY MATURATION

Figure 12: Prototype Hardware used for Cyclotron
Testing and Demonstration of TRL-4.

This section gives a brief history of the maturation of
this computer technology. The computer experiment
within RadSat has been matured from TRL-1 in 2007 to
its current level of TRL-6 through a variety of
demonstrations.
With each demonstration, the
computer system has been implemented in different
form factors and different levels of complexity.
Between 2008 and 2010, a prototype of this computer
system was implemented using commercial FPGA
evaluation boards. These boards, in conjunction with
prototype boards, allowed the concept to be matured to
TRL-2 and TRL-3 through numerous demonstrations to
engineers from the Marshall Space Flight Center.
Engineers from MSFC traveled to MSU four times
during this period to evaluate the technology. MSU
faculty and students also traveled to MSGC three times
to demonstrate the computer system. The following
figure shows the computer technology proof of concept
prototype that was used to demonstrate TRL-3.

After the cyclotron demonstrations, the computer
technology was implemented in a form factor that
supported high altitude balloon flight testing. A standalone power supply was designed and integrated with
the computer system in addition to a data logging
system.
Between 2011 and 2013, the computer
technology was flown on eight high altitude balloon
missions. Six of the balloon flights were conducted by
the Montana Space Grant Consortium’s BOREALUS
program to altitudes of 90,000 feet in southwest
Montana. Two of the balloon flights were conducted
by NASA’s Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility to
altitudes of 120,000 feet over New Mexico and
Arizona. This validated the technology in a relevant
environment and demonstrated TRL-5. The following
figure shows a montage of images associated with the
TRL-5 balloon flight demonstrations.

MSU
Computer

MSU
Computer

Figure 11: Prototype Hardware used to
Demonstrate TRL-3.
In 2010, the computer technology was implemented in
a 4”x4”x4” cube form factor to facilitate testing under
radiation bombardment in a cyclotron. Between 2010
and 2011 the computer system was tested twice at the
Texas A&M Radiation Effects Facility while being
bombarded with the ion Kr at 25 MeV/AMU. The
computer system demonstrated an integration of
technology components and validation in a laboratory
environment to achieve TRL-4. The following figure
shows the computer system in its TRL-4 form factor
and the test apparatus used to place the computer
system in the beam of the cyclotron.

Figure 13: Computer Hardware and Flight
Configuration used to Demonstrate TRL-5.
After the balloon tests, the computer system was
implemented in a form factor that supported more
rigorous flight testing. Between 2013 and 2014 the
computer was redesigned in a standard 1U CubeSat
format (100cm3) and coupled with more advanced
stand-alone power system. In 2014 the computer
technology was flown on the SL-9 suborbital vehicle
from UP Aerospace LLC to an altitude of 408,000 feet.

LaMeres
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This flight validated the operation of prototype
subsystems in a relevant end-to-end environment to
demonstrate TRL-6. This rocket flight could have
demonstrated TRL-7, but some hardware failures
within the computer prevented a demonstration of the
full system. The computer is scheduled to be flown
again on the sounding rocket in 2015. The following
figures show a montage of images associated with the
TRL-6 demonstration.

MSU
Computer
Figure 15: RadSat System Architecture.
The satellite contains two sub-systems, the avionics and
the FPGA-based computer. The avionics sub-system
contains the electrical power system (EPS), which
interfaces with external solar panels to power the
satellite. The EPS was designed and built at MSU in
the SSEL. Also in the avionics is an Astronautical
Development Helium 100 UHF/VHF radio, which
serves as the communication link to the ground station
located at MSU. The command and data handling
system in the avionics is implemented using a Pumpkin
CubeSat motherboard containing a PIC24 processor.
The avionics system contains an interface board
(MFIB) that is used to communicate and power other
experiments within the satellite.
An Experiment
Umbilical is used to connect the avionics to an
experiment and provides a single 9VDC voltage and a

Figure 14: Computer Hardware and Flight
Configuration used to Demonstrate TRL-6.

RADSAT MISSION CONCEPT
Satellite Architecture
The purpose of the RadSat mission is to demonstrate
the radiation tolerant computer technology in a space
environment under bombardment with statistically
significant faults to verify reliable operation.
The
following figure shows the block diagram of the
proposed satellite.
LaMeres
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bi-directional UART communication channel. The
FPGA-based computer is architected as an experiment
within the satellite. The FPGA system contains a local
power regulation board, an FPGA board, and a
radiation sensor board. It should be noted that the
avionics sub-system has been flown on a prior CubeSat
mission and the FPGA-based computer has been flown
on a sounding rocket and has an upcoming
demonstration on the International Space Station. The
SSTP project has funded the integration of the two subsystems into a full 3U CubeSat for an orbital
demonstration of the computer technology.
Orbital Test Environment
The computer system technology has been matured as
far as it can within a terrestrial environment. The next
step in evaluating the SEE immunity of the computer is
a flight demonstration in space. Space testing is
required because the energy levels necessary to
empirically test the system’s SEE immunity cannot be
produced on earth. Cyclotrons and particle accelerators
cannot reproduce the space environment accurately and
are typically used to bombard sub-systems in modified
form factors such as exposed integrated circuits that
have regions intentionally exposed to increase their
SEE susceptibility. These types of tests do not meet the
requirements of a full system prototype demonstration
in an operational environment in order to achieve TRL7. While high altitude balloons provide an easily
accessible platform for flight testing, they do not reach
a sufficiently high altitude to expose the computer
system to the representative mission radiation
environment nor do they provide sufficient time to
perform a comprehensive evaluation of the system’s
reliability. Sounding rocket tests will enable the
computer to reach a sufficient altitude (72 miles) to be
exposed to the representative environment, but they
also do not provide sufficient exposure time to perform
a comprehensive analysis.

Figure 16: Anticipated Number of Faults in LEO
for a Virtex-6 FPGA.
It is predicted that our system will experience 14 high
energy radiation strikes per day, of which 2-3 will result
in SEE faults. As anticipated, the largest number of
faults occurs while passing through the south Atlantic
anomaly and over the Earth’s magnetic poles. The
computer is expected to experience 2-3 faults per day,
which results in ~2,000 faults during a 24 month orbit.
This is a sufficiently large sample to verify the system’s
fault immunity. Our predictions correspond well to
SEE data collected from the Goddard Space Flight
Center’s SpaceCube system (Virtex-4), which flew on
the ISS as part of MISSE-7 [27]. The following figure
shows the locations for SEEs experienced over the
course of 10 months during ISS deployment. Our
computer will experience approximately 20x more
SEEs due to being fabricated in a more modern process
node (Virtex-6 = 45nm vs. Virtex-4 = 90ns).

A high inclination, Low Earth Orbit that passes through
the South Atlantic Anomaly and the poles is an ideal
environment for demonstrating the computer’s SEE
mitigation strategy. This orbit provides a sufficient
amount of time for the system to experience a
reasonable number of faults to evaluate the system’s
radiation tolerance.
Our team has extracted the
predicted radiation strike and corresponding fault rates
from the CRÈME96 tool if our system was flown on the
ISS. The following figure shows a graphical depiction
of the faults caused by heavy ions and those caused by
trapped protons during a LEO orbit.
Figure 17: Location of SEEs during GSFC
SpaceCube Deployment (Virtex-4) on MISSE-7 over
10 month Period [31].
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R. J. Weber, “Reconfigurable hardware
accelerators for high performance radiation
tolerant computers,” Ph.D. dissertation, Dept.
Elec. and Comp. Eng., Montana State Univ.,
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7.

S. A. Harkness, “Experiment Platform to
Facilitate Flight Testing of Fault Tolerant
Reconfigurable Computer Systems,” M.S. thesis,
Dept. Elec. and Comp. Eng., Montana State
Univ., Bozeman, MT, 2015.

8.

National Research Council. Earth Science and
Applications from Space: A Midterm Assessment
of NASA's Implementation of the Decadal
Survey. Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press, 2012.

9.

“NASA Space Technology Roadmaps –
Modeling, Simulation, Information Technology
& Processing Roadmap, Technology Area 11”,
[Online],
Available:www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/home/roadm
aps/index.html , Nov. 2010.

10.

NASA Strategic Plan 2014, NASA, Doc. No.
NP-2014-01-964-HQ.
Available
[Online]:
http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/FY2
014_NASA_SP_508c.pdf

11.

A. Holmes-Siedle, L. Adams, “Handbook of
radiation Effects”, 2nd edition, New York,
Oxford University Press, 2002.

12.

C. Claeys, E. Simoen, “Radiation Effects in
Advanced
Semiconductor
Materials
and
Devices”, Berlin Heidelberg, ISBN 3-540-433937, Springer-Verlag, 2002.

13.

T. M. Buerkle, “Ionizing radiation detector for
environmental awareness in FPGA-based flight
computers,” M.S. thesis, Dept. Elec. and Comp.
Eng., Montana State Univ., Bozeman, MT, 2012.

Fabula, J., et al., “The Total Ionizing Dose
Performance of Deep Submicron CMOS
Processes”,
Military
and
Aerospace
Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD)
Conference, Annapolis, MD, Sept 15-18, 2008.

14.

J. S. Hane, “A fault-tolerant computer
architecture for space vehicle applications,” M.S.
thesis, Dept. Elec. and Comp. Eng., Montana
State Univ., Bozeman, MT, 2012.

Quinn, H. et al., “High-Performance Computing
for Airborne Applications”, Nuclear and Space
Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC), Denver,
CO, July 19, 2010.

15.

Berg, M., et al., “Taming the SEU Beast Approaches and Results for FPGA Devices and
How To Apply Them”, NASA Electronic Parts
and Packaging (NEPP) Program Technology
Workshop, Greenbelt MD, June 2011.

16.

G. Anelli, et al, “Radiation Tolerant VLSI
Circuits in Standard Deep Submicron CMOS
Technologies for the LHC Experiments: Practical
Design Aspects”, IEEE Transaction on Nuclear
Science, Vol. 46, Issue 6, Part 1, Dec. 1999.

The Next Steps
RadSat is currently being implemented and tested in a
3U form factor for environmental testing. RadSat has
been accepted by the 2015 NASA CubeSat Launch
Initiative (CSLI) program for a flight in 2016 or 2017.
The ground operations for RadSat will be conducted at
Montana State University, which currently has 5
CubeSats in orbit. The current work underway is
finalizing the flight software and flight qualifying the
unit. The following figure shows a rendering of the
final RadSat satellite.

Figure 18: Rendering of Final 3U RadSat in LEO
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